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1 As initially established by Shaftesbury and Hutcheson and further refined by Kant, within 
the theoretical development of the 18th century, which laid the foundations of the aesthetic 
experience for posterity.
No Tension. David Hume’s 
Solution to Everyday Aesthetics
María Jesús Godoy
This study looks at the emerging branch of everyday aesthetics from the perspective of the fracture 
which exists in its core, as a result of the double reading of the everyday: the first, which elevates it to 
the realm of the extraordinary and the second, in which it remains strictly ordinary. Our purpose here is 
to repair this fracture by turning to David Hume’s functionalist aesthetics, where disinterest and utility 
are reconciled through sympathy and the affective experience of otherness that it provides. Once 
transferred to the everyday sphere, sympathy facilitates understanding between these two versions, 
since the aesthetic appreciation of everyday objects or common activities requires, like the second 
version, that they remain in the practical environment and, like the first, to see something special in 
them, which is the possibility of one’s  own or another’s  well-being. | Keywords: Everyday Aesthetics, 
Functional Beauty, Hume, Saito, Leddy
1. Introduction
In current aesthetic thought, the aesthetics of everyday life has emerged as 
a new field of study which has expanded the narrow focus of the aesthetic 
discipline established in the 18th century. Revisiting these old assumptions 
has led to calls for theoretical reflection on utilitarian objects and everyday 
activities which, although having a considerable presence in our lives, were 
aesthetically ignored due to their practical nature. Such useful items as 
lamps and actions like cooking, which take up a  large portion of our time 
and are therefore quite prosaic and ordinary, had no place in modern 
aesthetics, which was devoted to far nobler – and less common – artifacts 
and experiences; such was the case of the artistic object as an autonomous 
object and the aesthetic experience as a  contemplative and disinterested 
experience.1 By demanding a  new status and treatment for these other 
aesthetic realities within philosophical aesthetics, the aesthetics of the 
everyday represents both an update of traditional aesthetic postulates and 
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2 In line with Yuriko Saito’s thesis, in which the aesthetic discipline, originally oriented to the 
aesthetic phenomenon in its purely sensitive or perceptual nature, did not give preference to 
the artistic phenomenon with which it ended up being identified (Saito, 2017, p. 179).
3 Based on the distinction between free beauty and adherent beauty in Kant’s Critique 
of Judgement (Forsey, 2013).
the recovery of the original aesthetic spirit.2
Now, despite having a well-defined objective, this branch of aesthetics is far 
from being a homogeneous movement. It is, in fact, a  fractured movement 
as can be seen by its two different variants: the “weak” and the 
“strong” (Dowling, 2010), or as they are also known, the “expansive” and the 
“restrictive” (Leddy, 2015). The interesting thing here is that the first 
variant, more accommodating and, therefore, less transgressive, uses 
traditional, artistically inspired aesthetic concepts to characterise ordinary 
objects and processes which, thus detached from their functionality, are 
subject to the same parameters that have regulated art throughout the last 
two centuries; those which eventually made it something different, strange 
and unusual. This “weak” or “expansive” variant closely follows the 
indications of modern aesthetic discourse, helping it to perpetuate itself 
over time – to ‘expand’, as the name suggests – by now extrapolating it to 
a new genre of gadgets and situations. The “strong” or “restrictive” variant, 
on the other hand, more heterodox and disruptive, advocates seeing 
common objects and activities as they really are, objects and activities that 
are not at all special, with nothing to do  with art and the privileged 
experience it entails. It thus tends to elude the influence of modern 
aesthetic discourse – to ‘restrict’ its focus – which, guided by the artistic 
paradigm, has sought to preserve the uniqueness of both the artistic piece 
and the aesthetic experience. In this variant, the aesthetic condition must 
be able to combine with the spontaneity and functionalism of everyday life. 
Moreover, it must be brought about by this spontaneity and functionalism 
and not by external factors that interfere illegitimately and try to override 
them.
Thus, the profound clash between normality and exceptionality within the 
limits of everyday aesthetics is obvious; a tension, in the words of its main 
proponent, Thomas Leddy (2005), or a  paradox, in those of his colleague 
Yuriko Saito (2007, p. 50). This situation has led Jane Forsey (2014) to 
encourage a  rapprochement of positions, given the important underlying 
component that unites them, such as the aesthetic revaluation of our most 
mundane existence. However, while Forsey crystallises this need for 
agreement in an aesthetic theory of design of Kantian traits,3 here it refers 
to the aesthetic ideas of David Hume, to the concept of functional beauty 
that sustains them and in which they meet dialectically (López Lloret, 
2003), in a superb balancing act, the two aspects which clash in the double 
reading of everyday aesthetics: disinterest and usefulness. The former is 
identified here with the exceptionality of the “weak” interpretation in its 
attempt to transfer the artistic model to everyday objects and situations, 
and the latter, with the normality of the “strong” in its safeguarding of the 
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4 In this regard, see Parsons and Carlson (2008, pp. 167-195), Forsey (2013, pp. 193-243) and 
Melchionne (2013), among others.
5 For this reason, Hume’s major aesthetic work, Of the Standard of Taste (1757), focused on 
purely artistic objects – and more specifically, poetic objects (Jones, 1993) –, falls outside our 
theoretical framework. Even so, we will take some aspects of it into account in our discussion.
6 “In common life, we may observe that the circumstance of utility is always appealed 
to” (Hume, 2006, V, I, p. 33).
practical environment where the object is placed or the activity happens.
My purpose is thus outlined: to resolve the internal discrepancies in the 
aesthetics of everyday life from the perspective of Hume’s  aesthetic 
functionalism – along with its profound ethical component – and, in passing, 
provide the movement with the theoretical substratum and reflective 
antecedent that it has sometimes lacked.4 To achieve this, the process is as 
follows: we will begin by breaking down each of the versions mentioned, 
drawing on, in the case of the “weak” version, the idea of ‘strangeness’ 
systematically invoked by its advocates and, in the case of the “strong” version, 
the notion of ‘familiarity’. This task will enable a better understanding of the 
differences between them and the supposed difficulty in reconciling them; 
supposed, because that is precisely what we set out to achieve by then turning 
to the functionalist aesthetics of the young Hume, developed mainly in 
A Treatise of Human Nature (1740) and in An Enquiry concerning the Principles of 
Morals (1751). These two works are specifically concerned with the ‘utilitarian’ 
arts, those which, while possessing an objective physical component and the 
capacity to influence daily life, stem from a  constructive and architectural 
tradition.5 Furthermore, in both works disinterest and usefulness fit together 
through sympathy, the third and definitive concept which, by forming a  link 
between them, makes them compatible, as we hope it will also do with the two 
positions on everyday life – since we will expressly apply it to them. After all, 
as Hume himself observes, whoever says everyday life also says utility,6 so they 
can be taken as equivalent expressions. In short, Hume’s sympathy will show us 
that, rather than a  struggle or skirmish, what really exists behind these two 
visions of the everyday is an internal complementarity.
2. “Weak” Version: The Everyday as Extraordinary
In general terms, the “weak” formulation of everyday life links the aesthetic 
dimension of the everyday to a  kind of exceptionality that allows it to be 
appreciated in a  different way than is customary. The idea is that an object 
such as a chair or an action such as getting dressed, temporarily leaving aside 
their imperceptibility in the normal course of life, suddenly catches our 
attention, so we not only see them as we have never seen them before – in fact, 
it is as if we are seeing them for the first time –, but they take on a  new 
meaning.
Thomas Leddy, advocate par excellence of this modality, argues that the mere 
fact of paying attention to an object – as Sherry Irvin (2008) contends in her 
example of a  routine activity such as having a  coffee – does not make it 
aesthetic. Aesthetic attention must be given to it, which means approaching 
the object, dispossessing it of its normality and investing in it the 
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7 The artistic is, in itself, extraordinary in that it departs from the normal course of life.
8 In her case, from the “strong” meaning of everyday life, as we will see later (Saito, 2012).
9 Leddy has been a pioneer in promoting the aesthetic character of common, traditional 
despised perceptual properties – clean, cosy and tidy, for example –; but above all, aesthetic 
properties with a positive sign (Leddy, 1995), because the negative ones – the antonyms of the 
previous qualifiers –, however much the author claims to accept them, are not for him 
properly aesthetic (Leddy, 2012, p. 140).
exceptionality that by its very essence it lacks. It is therefore an approach that 
makes the everyday automatically extraordinary (Leddy, 2012, p. 112), which 
inescapably refers to the artistic sphere.7 While perfectly distinguishing 
between practical artifacts and works of art – Leddy asserts that the everyday 
aesthetics covers a  necessary area, traditionally neglected by the aesthetic 
discipline (Leddy, 2012, p. 17) –, he claims that the aesthetic experience of 
utilitarian objects removes them from the continuous flow – instrumental and 
interested – in which they are embedded and grants them the superior status 
of other types of objects such as paintings, poems or symphonies. Not 
surprisingly, the ordinary seems trivial and boring, and of little importance, 
until it becomes aesthetic or special – artistic – and generates a  memorable 
experience – just like art (Leddy, 2012, p. 59). This transformation – artification, 
as Saito calls it8 – then allows for different degrees and intensities, ranging 
from the basic level of the simply clean or tidy, to the complexity of the 
sublime or tragic. Nevertheless, they are all included in the aesthetic category. 
They are all to do  with beauty, since the object – or the action or process –, 
having left the realm of the inconsequential, enters that of the conspicuous 
and worthy of remembering (Leddy, 2012, p. 142).
As for the transformation process, Leddy explains that it happens because the 
utilitarian object, the ordinary activity, acquires what he, appropriating the 
term coined by Benjamin, calls “aura”, and which moves it from the realm of 
the irrelevant and unnoticed – or the practical, to put it simply – into the realm 
of the interesting and striking. Nonetheless, his concept of aura is different 
from Benjamin’s as Leddy expressly states: it is not an intrinsic property of the 
object, but a  phenomenological property that it is acquired through our 
interaction with it, which makes us experience it in a particularly intense way, 
giving it a  “heightened significance in which it seems to extend beyond 
itself” (Leddy, 2012, pp. 116-117). The fact that an object has an aura then 
means several things to us, according to Leddy: that we give it greater 
significance than it actually has, that it radiates a  kind of glow and that it 
seems singularly vivid and real. We presuppose, in other words, a magic that is 
completely lacking in its natural practical environment. For this reason, we 
attribute aesthetic properties to it whereby we can say that the experience we 
are having is that of the aura and its fascination. We thus qualify a  sofa as 
elegant because, by marvelling at it, we distinguish it from all the other 
anodyne sofas in the world, which in comparison are indifferent and have no 
value other than the purely practical.9 With this judgement we confirm that we 
have had an aesthetic experience of the marvellous sofa since, freed from its 
futility, it has been able to reveal its inner poetry. In this sense, the author 
evokes the figures of the aesthete and the flâneur as examples of individuals 
appreciating the everyday, insofar as they contemplate the world “with the eyes 
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of an artist” (Leddy, 2012, p. 260) and, in doing so, they show those who are less 
perceptive the wonderful – the aesthetic – side of banal things.
Leddy’s  recognition of the affinity between his approaches and those of John 
Dewey, on the one hand (Leddy, 2012, p. 55), and Edward Bullough, on the 
other (Leddy, 2012, pp. 130-131), is thus understandable. Both point towards 
the artistic paradigm enshrined in modern aesthetics to which Leddy himself 
subscribes. In Dewey’s  case – whom Leddy, like many others, considers to be 
a  mentor of everyday aesthetics (2012, pp. 44, 77, 204)10 –, Leddy values his 
quasi-mystical idea of the aesthetic experience, which, thanks to the continuity 
Dewey established between art and ordinary life, extends beyond the 
specifically artistic object to the bland and grey instrumental object. Hence for 
Dewey, following Leddy, the experience of viewing a  Van Gogh canvas in 
a  gallery is just as aesthetic as tasting a  dish in a  restaurant or fixing a  car 
breakdown in a  garage. There is no difference between them; they are all 
“experiences”, as Dewey says, because they are all aesthetic, which means they 
are pleasant and complete experiences because, having reached their peak, 
they form a  unity. In addition, they are so  intense – and this is where Leddy 
(2012, pp. 86-87) draws a  parallel with his concept of aura – that whoever 
experiences them feels transported to another world, as if plunged into 
a supernatural reality where the whole of existence takes on a new meaning. As 
far as Bullough is concerned, Leddy stays with the idea of illumination – also 
associated with aura – which Bullough’s  theory on aesthetic distance 
establishes. This idea involves glimpsing in the simplest things – by putting 
them out of gear with usual practical interests –, unexpected elements which, 
with the help of a little imagination, possess a mysterious component – in the 
thick fog over the sea, a sinking ship full of passengers, as seen in Bullough – 
with which to cast a spell on the ordinary object under our gaze (Leddy, 2012, 
pp. 246-247).
3. “Strong” Version: The Everyday as Strictly Everyday
Unlike the “weak” formulation, the “strong” version asserts the historically 
neglected everyday life as pure everyday life, and thus without surprises or 
exile to other places. Coffee makers, irons or screwdrivers, on the one hand, 
and doing the laundry, tidying up or throwing out the rubbish, on the other, 
thus remain in their original practical context. They are not extraordinary at all 
and it is, in that uninspiring and unappealing setting, that the aesthetic 
experience takes place. In its desire to preserve the everyday as strictly 
‘everyday’, this approach aims to prevent the monotonous and the boring, but 
also the simplicity and humbleness of what is before us, from being buried 
beneath the grandeur, spectacle and drama customary in the art world. The 
intention here, explains its main proponent, Saito, is to move onto the 
aesthetic radar everything in everyday life that goes unnoticed because it is 
something we do – in the case of an action – or something we have contact 
with – in the case of a  gadget – unconsciously and without paying much 
attention (Saito, 2017, pp. 24-25). But Saito goes even further: this is about 
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negative aesthetic experiences, which she deems essential as a warning that there is 
something in our life that is not working as it should, and therefore needs to be changed.
12 In Martin Heidegger’s work Being and Time (1988).
moving them onto the aesthetic radar without the patina of exoticism afforded 
them by the “weak” variant, because, as she says, chopping vegetables while 
feeling the smoothness or roughness of their skin on our fingers, or listening to 
the sound of the knife hitting the chopping board is one thing, and doing it as 
if we have never done it before is quite another. In the first case, the everyday 
remains as it is – we simply switch off the automatic pilot with which we 
perform such actions –, while in the second, through the freshness inherent in 
novelty, it becomes exclusive.
In revealing the narrow-mindedness of modern aesthetics, the “strong” 
formulation really wants the aesthetic phenomena to which we tend to be 
immune, the “valley moments” as defined by Saito (2007, p. 48), to have the 
same relevance as the “peak moments” with which we identify artistic activity. 
The reason is that they form the greater part of our aesthetic life, despite their 
functionality and the fact that they are generally relegated to the background. 
In this sense, the Japanese author says: “It may not be enjoyable, memorable, 
or special, but such quotidian ordinariness does provide an aesthetic 
(understood in a  classificatory sense) texture of everyday life” (Saito, 2017, 
p. 27). So, this formulation aims to focus on those objects and situations that, 
in their triviality and usefulness, provide an aesthetic experience, albeit 
perhaps less powerful and intense, or less appealing, than that established by 
18th  century enlightened thinkers on the basis of the artistic standard, but in 
any case an aesthetic experience and, as such, most likely pleasurable and 
certainly worthy of attention.11
If the main element in the “weak” formulation is strangeness, the decisive 
element in the “strong” formulation is familiarity, as echoed by Arto Haapala 
and Saito herself. To introduce this concept, Haapala turns to its natural 
opposite, or strangeness, where he believes its genesis lies and which he 
characterises in much the same as Leddy characterises the aura. He affirms that 
it is a phenomenological property that things acquire through our interaction 
or, rather, lack of interaction with them, since we tend to consider things 
strange when we are not familiar or have no contact with them. Quite the 
opposite happens when something is part of our life, becoming homey and 
familiar. In this sense, Haapala invokes the Heideggerian existential analysis of 
a tool such as a hammer12 which, when working well, we do not notice. In other 
words, while fulfilling its purpose, its being-in-the-world, as Heidegger would 
say, it is totally invisible because it is so  familiar to us. Only when it stops 
working, do  we notice its presence, which we thus find particularly strange, 
synonymous here with deprived of use.
In this familiar and close environment, the aesthetic experience is described by 
the Finnish author in the strictly everyday terms we have seen in Saito, as the 
serenity that emerges from the lack of visual, auditory or other sensory 
requirements around us (Haapala, 2005). It is as if the everyday was already 
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is not necessary to leave the British Isles to find the classical synthesis, because, as it was later 
expressed by Leon Battista Alberti and, above all, Andrea Palladio, it was imported there in 
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tradition, to which the philosopher was always receptive.
pleasurable – therefore aesthetic – because of the sense of comfort and 
stability it brings, the feeling of knowing that everything is safe and under 
control. At no point then does it need to abandon its idiosyncrasies – whether 
that be comfort as it is here, or modesty and insignificance as seen in Saito –, 
just because of our familiarity with it, which provides a certain sense of being 
safe and at home.
4. David Hume, A Reliable Meeting Point
From the “weak” variant, Thomas Leddy has emphasised that even in his 
belief that the everyday, experienced aesthetically, is inexorably brought 
into the realm of the extraordinary – increased attention always has this 
effect –, he is also aware that this circumstance greatly alters its intrinsic 
nature. In other words, as the everyday becoming extraordinary ceases to be 
strictly everyday, “there is a tension with the very concept of the aesthetics 
of everyday life” (Leddy, 2005, p. 18). In the same sense but from the other 
perspective, Yuriko Saito argues that although illuminating moments in our 
ordinary lives allow us to find hidden treasures (Saito, 2007, p. 50), it is still 
a  contradiction that in order to reveal the aesthetic value of everyday life, 
the familiar must be denied, or “defamiliarized” (Saito, 2017, p. 20). She is 
also convinced that by elevating the everyday to artistic status based on the 
dominant aesthetic model, the intrinsic strangeness of that artistic 
dimension will eventually vanish, as the familiarity against which it stands 
out is no longer there. For this reason, Saito considers that, rather than 
a coming together of the two meanings of the everyday as Forsey proposes 
– and which led her to the neutral field of design (Forsey, 2013, pp. 137-192) 
–, there should be a  balance between what each of these meanings 
represents: the intensity of art and the mundane nature of life (Saito, 2017, 
p. 21), which is what we believe is produced in Hume’s  aesthetic 
functionalism by means of sympathy, as we are about to explain.
It must be said at the outset that Hume’s aesthetics offers one of the most 
solid and thorough non-reductionist solutions to the dialectic between 
disinterest and utility in 18th century British aesthetics (López Lloret, 
2003). Hence, we can speak correctly of functionalist aesthetics. In 
Hume’s thinking on beauty, disinterest as a hallmark of the aesthetic object, 
which the Scottish philosopher draws from Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, and 
its essential utility, to which he arrives at mainly through Berkeley, 
effectively come together in a  successful counterbalance or attractive 
tension. This fact makes Hume a  faithful trustee of the classic synthesis 
between the useful and the pleasant theorised by Vitruvius.13 In many 
passages of the Treatise and the Enquiry, the  author effectively indicates 
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that aesthetic pleasure is directly proportional to function and, through it, 
to the comfort and safety perceived in the object:
[…] a great part of the beauty, which we admire either in animals or in 
other objects, is deriv’d from the idea of convenience and utility […] 
That shape, which produces strength, is beautiful in one animal; and 
that which is a sign of agility in another. The order and convenience of 
a  palace are no less essential to its beauty, than its mere figure and 
appearance. In like manner the rules of architecture require, that the 
top of a pillar should be more slender than its base, and that because 
such a  figure conveys to us the idea of security, which is pleasant; 
whereas the contrary form gives us the apprehension of danger, which 
is uneasy. (Hume, 2007, II, I, VIII, p. 195)
As stated in the quote, not only utility, but also convenience and security or 
strength, core principles of architecture – the classical architectural principles 
of Vitruvius –, are for Hume the basis for the ability to produce aesthetic 
pleasure. By adhering to the theory of architectural orders – through its 
essential element, the column – and its proportional variations – the 
measurable relationships between the upper and lower parts –, the 
philosopher thus offers a functional explanation (they are this way so that the 
building seems safe), emanating from a  utilitarian theory (it is more 
convenient to live safely in those constructions), which ultimately translates 
into pleasure (or the beauty of the built form).
However, here the appeal of this aesthetic functionalism is that it rests on 
an affection such as sympathy which manages to bring together two initially 
conflicting terms such as voluptas and utilitas – and, hand in hand with the 
latter, firmitas, as in Vitruvius. This is why we think it could also articulate the 
normality-exceptionality binomial of the everyday, where the underlying 
tension is in fact the same, pleasure versus utility. It is worth remembering 
that sympathy for Hume, as for other British Enlightenment thinkers, is the 
foundation for the 18th century moral proposals formulated as an alternative 
to Hobbesian natural selfishness. Through this emotion, sociability was 
considered a  natural human tendency, together with an equally natural 
propensity towards goodness and virtue. For all of these philosophers – 
Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and, of course, Hume –, sympathy warmed the cold 
relationship between individuals and elevated sociability to a  universal 
brotherhood in its capacity to be widely displayed. In Hume’s  case, this 
openness to other people was also presented as an inclination towards 
communicability and emotional transfer “however different from, or even 
contrary to our own” (Hume, 2007, II, I, XI, p. 206); that is to say as the 
substratum of a  relentless exchange to and from others’ impressions and 
ideas, whereby the experiences of others become our own, thus tracing 
a  permanent set of relationships between oneself and others (Infante del 
Rosal, 2013).
This social interrelationship, with its ethical imprint, is easily recognisable in 
the way sympathy operates within the framework of Hume’s  aesthetic 
functionalism. Ultimately, it all really boils down to this maxim: there is 
an  aesthetic experience and, therefore, beauty, if a  deferred utility is 
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14    Therefore, beauty acquires a moral aspect, because beauty and aesthetics are “moralized” 
certainly in Hume, as Peter Kivy says, unlike in Hutcheson, where according to Kivy it is 
morality that “is aestheticized” (Kivy, 2003, p. 287).
15 For Hume, it is indifferent if the user is real or potential; the relevant thing is the well-being 
that can be achieved with the utilitarian object: “A house, that is contriv’d with great 
judgement for all the commodities of life, pleases us upon the account; tho’ perhaps we are 
sensible, that no one will ever dwell in it. A fertile soil, and a happy climate, delight us by 
a  reflection on the happiness which they wou’d afford the inhabitants, tho’ at present the 
country be desert and uninhabited” (Hume, 2007, III, III, I, p. 373).
16 Townsend outlines that this disinterested pleasure in Hume is not a prelude to that which will 
appear later in Kant; it is only a way of understanding affective experience beyond the 
dichotomy of moral character egotism/benevolence (Townsend, 2014, pp. 100, 109, 143 and 
154).
17 In Hume, furniture, clothes, carriages, houses, lands and possessions of a very different 
nature.
experienced.14  In other words, aside from an object capable of meeting a need 
or a  utilitarian object – or just utilitas –, there must also be a  subject who 
notices how this possibility takes or can take effect in another subject – or 
voluptas –, who, by addressing their needs, is pleased.15 The important point is 
that the interested pleasure of this second subject, that of the direct user of 
the object, in turn generates a disinterested pleasure in the first, since it arises 
sympathetically from the perceived benefit attained by a  fellow human and 
always through imaginative intercession.16 Thanks to the imagination, the 
spectator effectively becomes aware of what it means to satisfy a  need, 
attaching themselves to the beneficiary of the object and also feeling satisfied 
– feeling it next to them or with them, by their side, through a transfer of the 
original satisfaction –, even though no personal benefit is obtained: “By a turn 
of imagination, by a refinement of reflection, by an enthusiasm of passion, we 
seem to take part in the interests of others, and imagine ourselves divested of 
all selfish considerations” (Hume, 2006, appendix II, p. 90). The spectator then 
feels satisfaction out of sheer sympathy and, because this pleasure is 
disinterested, it is also entirely aesthetic:
Cloaths which warm, without burdening the body; which cover, without 
imprisoning the limbs, are well-fashioned. In every judgement of 
beauty, the feelings of the person affected enter into consideration, and 
communicate to the spectator similar touches of pain or pleasure. 
(Hume, 2006, V, II, p. 41)
The quote brings together the two articulating elements in the sympathetic 
bond: the object and its formal construction or structure – here, warm clothes 
–, from an examination of which its potential to satisfy a  need is deduced – 
that of shelter and also comfort –, and a subject – the wearer of the clothing – 
whose needs are satisfied. In this happy conjunction, the spectator is 
imaginatively placed and, even knowing that they are the outside with no 
intention of participating, they themselves feel satisfied.
Transferring Hume’s  way of acting sympathetically to the realm of everyday 
life, it can be said that only when there is a  functional object17, providing 
a service to a human being, is it then in a position to be aesthetically valued. 
The object is thus required to remain ordinary as Saito intends, integrated into 
its practical world – in accordance with the “strong” modality as a whole–, even 
if this means disappearing from the user’s  sight, as is the case with 
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19 The philosopher talks about some things “in which, tho’ we have no hope of partaking, yet we 
enter into them by the vivacity of the fancy, and share them, in some measure, with the 
proprietor” (2007, II, II, V, p. 235).
Heidegger’s  hammer discussed by Haapala; or, alternatively, being diluted in 
its role, because it works exactly as expected. Nevertheless, the fact that its 
presence goes unnoticed by the subject who uses it, does not make it invisible 
at all. Thanks to Hume, we know that there is another subject paying attention 
to it and who, in doing so, allows the aesthetic condition to be added to its 
instrumental nature. This other individual also relates to the object, albeit not 
in a profitable or interested way, but in a purely contemplative – disinterested 
– way, as in the “weak” modality of the everyday, since it is a  strictly visual 
relationship and from a  distance. Endowed with great sensitivity or with an 
artist’s  eyes, as Leddy says – with a  minimal capacity to connect 
sympathetically with peers, in Hume’s  ethical terms – this second individual 
discovers some benefits in the object that escape the first. It is thus led towards 
the exceptionality of Leddy, but without forcing it to move away from the 
normality where it is embedded, as argued by Saito, because the object remains 
in the practical environment where the task is performed. This is thus how this 
spectator subject actually perceives the well-being that the user derives from 
its functionality, the pleasure that this beneficiary obtains and that gives rise 
to their own.
For our purposes, we must also bear in mind the important role that possession 
of the artifact plays in Hume for its aesthetic consideration: so much so that it 
is this private ownership itself on which the beauty of a  utensil ultimately 
depends.18 On the part of the owner, they must possess, have possessed, or be 
able to possess, the object from which to derive satisfaction from its use: 
“A  prince, that is possess’d of a  stately palace, commands the esteem of the 
people upon that account; and that first, by the beauty of the palace, and 
secondly, by the relation of property, which connects it with him” (Hume, 2007, 
II, II, I, p. 215). As for the non-owner or simple spectator, despite not owning 
the object – and having no expectations of doing so, as Hume indicates19 –, 
they must enjoy the other person’s  use of their possession: “Wherever 
an  object has a  tendency to produce pleasure in the possessor, or in other 
words, is the proper cause of pleasure, it is sure to please the spectator, by 
a delicate sympathy with the possessor” (Hume, 2007, III, III, I, p. 368). In this 
sense, we must remember that in the mid-18th century British context, the 
Industrial Revolution was in its infancy and, although social tastes had begun 
to move away from the luxury and finery of French Rococo, the object 
continued to have unique value for use and exchange, but above all, for display. 
It was a sign of ostentation and power, of the affirmation of the upper classes – 
of the old nobility first, of the stunning bourgeoisie, second –, who thus 
acquired the most expensive and exclusive items, guided by the criterion of 
comfort and, at the same time, by appearance and visual appeal, by the desire 
to project an image of opulence in society so  as to earn the respect and 
admiration of all.
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20 By chronological proximity we apply to Hume the dramaturgical metaphor as a hermeneutical 
tool of Adam Smith’s social theses used by López Lloret (2009).
21 I defend the difference of pleasures and, therefore, of emotions, invoking Hume’s own general 
theory of the mind, which expresses how the spectator’s pleasure, although resembling that of 
the user, is not exactly identical, because the original emotion has a force and a liveliness that 
the secondary or derivative one lacks: “In every judgement of beauty, the feelings of the 
person affected enter into consideration, and communicate to the spectator similar touches of 
pain or pleasure” (Hume, 2006, V, II, p. 41, my emphasis). Infante del Rosal (2013) holds 
a different opinion.
However, despite the importance of the nouveau riche, the bourgeois, for the 
advent of the capitalist economic system – not in vain is it the great 
protagonist of the public arena that everyone admires and wishes to 
emulate20 –, Hume’s functional beauty also makes him consider those who are 
not so  socially favoured, those who know that their well-being and pleasure 
depend on the well-being and pleasure of others with whom they will never be 
on a par, but with whom they still get along simply because they are lucky. It 
depends on non-owners or spectators, on their sympathetic pleasure as we 
have seen, for the common and ordinary object to be a beautiful object at the 
same time. It is they, delighting in gadgets beyond their reach and in 
inconsequential acts in which only the powerful participate, who have an 
aesthetic experience. It seems as if the aesthetic appreciation of the everyday, 
of granting the utilitarian object the power to surprise, was then a privilege of 
those who are socially deprived of possessions.
If so, the economic freedom which allows one to be surrounded by all kinds of 
whims and comforts would be at odds with enjoying them aesthetically. Hume, 
however, solves this kind of problem – and this is of particular interest for my 
goal – by pointing out that the owner also has access to the experience of 
beauty, but on one condition: one must step into the shoes of the non-owner – 
the spectator – to identify oneself as the gratified user of the object and 
thereby obtain a  pleasure which is necessarily different – being indirect and 
disinterested – from the pleasure obtained from one’s  superior status – the 
pleasure of profit and profitability – and which results in even greater pleasure: 
“’Tis certain, then, that if a  person consider’d himself in the same light, in 
which he appears to his admirer, he wou’d first receive a separate pleasure, and 
afterwards a  pride or self-satisfaction, according to the hypothesis above-
explain’d.” (Hume, 2007, II, I, XI, p. 208) Possession of the artifact does not, 
therefore, exclude the aesthetic experience, but it does require the suspension 
of direct use, that is, contemplation, or better still, sympathetic competence in 
order to imagine oneself in the spectator’s position and see things exactly as 
they see them. Even the owner is then forced to momentarily dispense with 
their interest in the object, with its use, in order to become paradoxically aware 
of the benefit it brings and, in so  doing, the aesthetic pleasure derived 
contributes to a greater utilitarian pleasure.21 
Hume’s commitment to virtually placing the user-owner next to the spectator 
in order to share their distant vision and pleasure, leads to an exegesis in 
everyday terms which favours the reconciliation between the two versions: by 
stepping out to contemplate oneself from the outside in the manner of 
Leddy’s  aesthete or flâneur, the beneficiary of the object comes to appreciate 
its beauty, but not because it becomes a work of art – as a useful object, it never 
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22 Even exceeding our framework of study, it is worth considering the imprint that this discourse 
by the young Hume will leave on his Of the Standard of Taste (1757); especially, in the 
characterisation of the true judges to whom Hume attributes, as spectators, a mind free of 
prejudice. In practice, this again means the ability to go out of oneself towards the other, to 
sympathise with them, but in addition to “forget, if possible, my individual being and my 
particular circumstances” (Hume, 1963, p. 245). The philosopher adds here the forgetting of 
the self, which introduces a first difference with respect to what we have seen in the Treatise 
and the Enquiry: the aim is to be absorbed by the other whose place is occupied, the public for 
whom the work – the poem – was originally written. A second difference is related to property, 
an essential component of beauty until now, but no longer so because the aesthetic object has 
changed too: no longer a useful object, the owner is of no importance (Shusterman (1989) 
thinks otherwise); the important thing is to know the identity of the original audience, to 
whom it was destined. And thus, exonerated from private ownership, the aesthetic experience 
increases affection; so much so that the true judge, transcending space and time, develops 
a  deferred sympathy and adopts exactly the point of view required by the work, that of the 
historical moment and place where it was born: “There needs but a certain turn of the 
thought or imagination to make us enter into all the opinions which then prevailed, and 
relish the sentiments or conclusions derived from them” (Hume, 1963, p. 253). So, once the 
game of possession declines in one way or another in 18th century British society, for Hume 
beauty becomes interested – disinterestedly – in the concerns of a broader population; 
immeasurable, given its dispersion in space and time, which the true judge must make their 
own to mentally recompose what a segment of that huge population – the pristine recipient 
of the work – may have felt in the moment they received it. It is only from this broadening 
vision that Hume’s ideal critic finds pleasure in the pleasure of those who either preceded him/
her  or who are thousands of kilometres away, and from that exemplary pleasure (Levinson, 
2002), he/she manages to make a just pronouncement.
stops functioning or making life easier –, but because that which previously 
had no aesthetic interest because it was unconscious and customary, is brought 
to consciousness, onto Saito’s  aesthetic radar. By putting themselves in the 
place of someone who enjoys their own pleasure, the owner becomes aware of 
the surrounding comforts which explain their advantageous social position. 
Opening their eyes to their comfortable existence is fascinating, as it is to the 
non-owner – the spectator – on seeing other people taking advantage of their 
own fortune and belongings. In summary, by learning to value everything they 
have through sympathetic connection with their fellow humans – because by 
approaching their fellow humans, they realise that not everyone has the same 
standard of living and opportunities –, the rich bourgeois happily –
  aesthetically – contemplates the many objects at their disposal which make 
their existence positively enviable.22
5. Conclusion
David Hume’s aesthetic functionalism is a good starting point in trying to solve 
internal disagreements within the aesthetic field of everyday life. His recourse 
to sympathy as a way of combining two such seemingly irreconcilable notions 
as disinterest and usefulness is also applicable when it comes to bringing 
together two other polarised concepts, now strictly everyday, such as normality 
and exceptionality, where the real conflict is between art and life. The routine 
in which we are immersed prevents us from seeing something valuable in 
useful objects, perhaps not something as remarkable as climbing Everest or 
hearing a  Beethoven symphony, but undoubtedly beautiful if given its due 
attention. That is if, as Hume suggests in his ethical approach to sympathy, we 
are capable of perceiving the happiness it provides, be that rejoicing for 
a  fellow human, feeling their well-being by proxy, or for ourselves, which we 
realise by meeting that fellow human and forgetting ourselves for a  few 
moments. Art and life do not clash in the aesthetics of the everyday. Instead, 
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they complement and help each other, reminding us of the ultimate fraternal 
bonds which hold us together, making us a little more human when all is said 
and done.
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